

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection: Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files
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 FOIA ID: F1997-066/6, D. Cohen
 Date: 08/04/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo (90652)	Clinton Brooks, Louis Michael, and Bob Linhard to Frank Carlucci re Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (w/notations), 3p R 1/10/11 F97-066/6 #91	9/9/87	B1
2. memo	Grant Green to Melvyn Levitsky, Col. William Matz, H. Lawrence Sandall, et al. re Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, 2p R 1/10/11 F97-066/6 #92	n.d.	B1
3. memo	from Matz, re decision paper, 1p	6/26/87	B1
4. decision paper	re Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, 7p	n.d.	B1
5. proposal	re State option, 2p PART. 3/17/06 F97-066/6 #95	n.d.	B1
6. proposal	re OSD/ACDA option, 3p PART. " " #96	n.d.	B1
7. memo (5070)	Cap to Asst. to President for National Security Affairs, re Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, 1p	7/1/87	B1

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
90652

September 14, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM:

for FRANK C. CARLUCCI *cl*

SUBJECT:

Location of Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC)

I mentioned to you asking you to help on the location of the NRRC's since I am a party at interest and feelings (as usual) are running strong. We are certain to be asked about their future location on Tuesday so time is short.

The decision package is attached. It is fairly straightforward reading. I will seek your views Monday afternoon.

SECRET ATTACHMENT

*PS - This need not be
A "TODAY" DECISION.*

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SYSTEM II
90652

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ACTION

September 9, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: *Lit* LINTON BROOKS/LOUIS G. MICHAEL/BOB LINHARD *lon* *3d*
SUBJECT: Location of U. S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center

The Department of Defense has forwarded for decision an inter-agency paper (Tab II) seeking a decision on the location of the U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC). The paper lists two options:

Option 1 -- The NRRC should be located in the Department of State; the communications and translation should be handled by 12 new hires; the Staff Director of the NRRC should be a senior State Department official reporting to the Secretary of State (State favors).

Option 2 -- The NRRC should be located in the White House complex; the communications and translation should be performed as an additional duty of those individuals now performing that task for the DCL (Hotline); the NRRC Director should be detailed for 2-3 years on a rotational basis from State, OSD and ACDA (OSD and ACDA favor).

JCS and the DCI's Representative take no position on location; the DCI's Representative notes that NRRC procedures must protect intelligence sources and methods.

Rationale

State argues that:

- NRRCs are an extension of the conduct of foreign relations, a State Department function; they should not be allowed to take on a "new" or "unique" character.
- Co-location of NRRC and DCL will give the false impression that the NRRC communications link is a crisis management tool and will impede the smooth functioning of both.
- The NRRC workload, while modest at the beginning, will increase as INF, etc., agreements are concluded.
- A State location allows drawing on State expertise and will be acceptable to Congressional leaders.

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR ^{FW} ~~F90~~ F97-0666 #91

BY RW NARA DATE 11/20/11

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OSD and ACDA argue that:

- NRRC operations will be modest at the start and not require the separate staff State proposes; if they grow, we can reevaluate in 2-3 years, but we should not build an elaborate structure until we need it.
- Colocation of NRRC and DCL communications makes sense both technically and fiscally and will save over \$1 million/year.
- A management structure that involves all agencies led by the NSC is how we got the agreement and is the best way to make its implementation smooth.
- NRRCs are intended to have a "new" or "unique" character; that's what supporters, especially Senators Nunn and Warner, expect.

Additional discussion is at Tab II. In what is becoming a routine practice, Secretary Weinberger sent you a separate memorandum (Tab III) urging you to accept the OSD position.

NSC Staff Views

In terms of making the system work or dealing with the Soviets, it probably doesn't matter where we locate the NRRC. While Fritz Ermarth correctly points out that it would be best if our location and the Soviets were comparable, we probably have no way of ensuring such an outcome.

Thus the issue is political and fiscal. On the one hand, it would be cheaper to locate the NRRC in the White House complex and would please Senators Nunn and Warner. (We started down the Risk Reduction road in a large measure because of their interest.) On the other hand, one reason Nunn and Warner want it here is to make it easier to expand to a free-standing agency, a step the Administration is united in opposing. Further, as Secretary Whitehead has made clear in discussions with Colin Powell, this is an important issue for State; selection of the White House will exacerbate State's discontent over NSC involvement in foreign relations. Finally, OSD and ACDA understate the difficulty of establishing it here; we will certainly need additional resources and at least one additional staff member. In contrast, we know State can handle the establishment if it is there.

Based on the above, we recommend that the U.S. NRRC be located within the White House complex. Implementation should be under the supervision of Lou Michael in order to ensure appropriate compatibility with existing DCL procedures. To begin the implementation process, we should require the existing Interagency Working Group to draft for the President's approval an NSDD

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establishing the U.S.NRRC and formalizing the appropriate inter-agency mechanisms for its supervision.

In addition, to continue to build on our good relations with Senators Nunn and Warner, we should make certain they learn this decision from us, not from State or the press. We will take care of notifying them once we have your decision.

We regard this as a close call. If, in your judgement, putting NRRCs in the White House will cause too much heartburn with Secretary Shultz at a time when we need to maintain harmony, there are no major problems in accepting the State recommendation and locating the NRRC there. We should decide this now, however, both because we will be embarrassed if the agreement is signed and we have no decision and because State needs an answer for budget planning. If you do accept our recommendation, we suggest either you call Secretary Shultz or Colin Powell call Deputy Secretary Whitehead before authorizing the transmission of the formal memorandum at Tab I.

Recommendation

That you authorize Grant Green to sign the memorandum at Tab I establishing the U.S. NRRC in the White House complex and directing the appropriate NSDD be drafted.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

That you assign Lou Michael primary responsibility for implementing this decision.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

That you either call Secretary Shultz or have Colin Powell call Deputy Secretary Whitehead informing them of this decision.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Fritz Ermarth, John Grimes and Jeff Hughes concur.

Attachments

Tab I	Green Memorandum to Agencies
Tab II	Interagency Decision Paper
Tab III	Weinberger Memorandum to Carlucci

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FRANK,
ON FISCAL,
POLITICAL, AND
"MAKES SENSE" BASIS
I VOTE FOR LH.
GPS WILL BE HEARD
FROM. READ IS
REPORT IF YOU HAVE
TIME. CP

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

SYSTEM II
90652

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. MELVYN LEVITSKY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

RADM JOSEPH C. STRASSER
Office of the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

COLONEL WILLIAM M. MATZ
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. WILLIAM STAPLES
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency

MR. H. LAWRENCE SANDALL
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Location of U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (U)

The interagency "Decision Paper on Location, Staffing and Operational Concept of U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center" has been reviewed. The U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) will be located within the White House complex. (C)

The Interagency Working Group on Confidence Building Measures should prepare a draft NSDD implementing this decision and establishing the appropriate interagency mechanisms for implementing this decision. This NSDD should provide for:

- The appropriate procedures to ensure control of access to the Risk Reductions Communication Link.
- Provisions for the routine transmittal of notifications provided for in the NRRC Agreement or additional notifications which may be required in the future. These procedures should be designed for simplicity and based on the existing procedures for providing ICBM launch notifications.
- Provisions for appropriate interagency coordination of the timing and agenda of the periodic meetings envisioned in the NRRC Agreement or the transmittal of "goodwill" notifications allowed by that agreement. (S)

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLRR F97-06646 #92
BY RW NARA DATE 11/10/11

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Procedures in the new NSDD should be compatible with existing procedures in NSDD 186 for operation of the Direct Communications Link. To emphasize that these are separate systems with separate functions, however, the new NSDD will be separately promulgated and will not be a revision to NSDD 186. (S)

The draft NSDD should be submitted for Presidential review not later than 15 October. (U)

Grant S. Green
Executive Secretary

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2.

Communications Procedures

FOIA(b)(1)

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Use of the NRRCL will be limited to those circumstances agreed upon by the U.S. and the USSR. [REDACTED] preformatted texts can be developed for most agreed types of notifications.

The U.S. NRRC staff will use existing secure communications links to ensure that NSC staff and designated representatives of participating agencies are provided verbatim texts (or translations) of all incoming messages without delay.

Staffing

The State Department will designate a Staff Director of the NRRC. [REDACTED]

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NRRCL

The Department of State will equip, operate, and maintain the NRRCL [REDACTED]

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TAB III

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